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Abstract
Following the Banking Committee on Banking Supervision, operational risk quantification
is based on the Basel matrix which enables sorting incidents. In this paper we analyze these
incidents in depth and propose strategies for carrying out the supervisory guidelines proposed
by the regulators. The objectives are as follows:
• On the first hand, banks need to provide a univariate capital charge for each cell of the
Basel matrix. That requires constructing Loss Distribution Functions (LDFs), which
implies estimating a frequency and a severity distribution. We show that the choice of
the theoretical distributions to build the LDFs has a tremendous impact on the capital
charges, especially if we do not take into account extreme losses.
• On the other hand, banks also need to provide a global capital charge corresponding
to the whole matrix. We highlight that a lack of consideration or a poor appreciation
of the dependence structure may lead to incorrect capital charges.
• Finally, we draw the attention of regulators and managers to two crucial points:
1. The necessity of splitting information sets in two parts while adjusting the severity
distribution. The first covering small and medium losses, and the latter containing
extreme losses (this point implies problems of granularity mentioned in the last
Basel II guidelines),
2. The choice of the risk measure which provides the capital amount. We emphasize
that the expected shortfall measure enables a better anticipation of large incidents
pertaining to operational risks.
Keywords: Operational risks - Loss Distribution Function - Risk Measures - EVT - Vine
Copula
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1 Introduction
In 2001, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provided a set of principles [4] for the
effective management and supervision of operational risks, designed for banks and domestic au-
thorities. According to these principles, banks could either use a basic, standard or advanced
approach to calculate their capital charges. The last approach known as advanced measurement
approach (AMA) requires banks to develop internal models.
However, at that time, operational risks management was a very young topic and due to its
absence in the Basel I accords [3], the level of maturity was not the same as for credit risk.
Therefore, Basel II initial requirements were very brief. They bound banks and financial in-
stitutions to use internal and external data, scenarios and qualitative criteria. They required
banks to compute capital charges on a yearly basis and at a "99.9% confidence level". Therefore,
at this time domestic authorities had no real experience of what would be a good approach to
model the operational risks.
It was only after banks initial attempt to comply with the regulatory requirements that the
BCBS started to be more precise on the kind of models they where expecting ([5, 6, 7]). New
proposals have been done, they correspond to what we could refer to as Basel II++ principles
which have to be monitored by the banks for the next few years. The purpose of this article is
to analyse the effects of these Basel II principles, to discuss the strategy before the deployment
of the next Basel system and to anticipate the applications of these new principles with respect
to the data on which these principles have been applied. The results presented in this paper
have been obtained using Caisse d’Epargne data sets (2006-2010), except the results presented
in Table 2, which have been obtained on a Banques Populaires data set (2008-2010)1.
1.1 Initial principles in Basel II proposals
In the second part of the 80’s when the regulators decided to establish rules to strengthen the
banking system there was nothing concerning operational risks. It was only in 2001 that su-
pervisors and the banking industry recognized the importance of operational risk in shaping
1The data sets used in this paper were sampled from Bertrand HASSANI’s PhD thesis financed by BPCE.
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the risk profile of financial institutions. Thus, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in
their first Pillar about minimum regulatory capital charge for risks, required banks to take into
account operational risks. As a result the Risk Management Group of the Basel Committee
introduced a new regulatory capital approach based on banks’ internal risk estimates called the
"Advanced Measurement Approach" (AMA). The principle of this regulatory capital charge for
operational risks was based on the following definition of operational risk: "the risk of loss result-
ing from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events".
This definition includes legal risks, but not the strategic, reputational or systemic risks. At
the time, the biggest challenge in applying the recommended guidelines stood in collecting and
analysing loss data sets, because this assumed efficient risk management devices and materials.
Collection system have been deployed in the past ten years. In this paper we will further discuss
data collection (in particular the granularity issue) and organisation as part of calculating the
minimum regulatory capital charge required from banks and insurance companies, in particular
the problem of granularity.
The first Pillar proposal was established in close collaboration with the banking industry. It
categorised operational risk exposures and losses into a series of standardised business lines and
events types. Table 1 provides an example of the matrix on which the supervisor worked to
provide the notorious capital requirement. This matrix was likely responsible for errors in the
calculation of the capital requirement due to the excessive aggregation of the data collected.
This was reflected in the guidelines for future Basel accords, and we will show in this paper the
impact of the level of granularity of matrix and the importance of taking heed of this point.
We mentioned earlier data collection specific to AMA to evaluate capital charges, which lead
to inquest another problem concerning the regulatory capital. The Committees’s preliminary
assessments of the possible level of operational risk regulatory capital was 20% of the current
regulatory capital (CRM). Practitioners thought that a 20% figure should be lowered, and that
12% of minimum regulatory capital would provide a more reasonable cushion and produce re-
quired capital amounts more in line with the operational risks faced by large, complex banking
organisations. However, it seems in reality that these first assesments (20% to 12%) were cali-
brated at a too low level. The first evaluation of operational risk capital requirements was used
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to define the Basic approach, and induced the weights of the standard approach. Since the banks’
incentive to adopt the AMA was a 25% capital allocation reduction compared to the standard
approach disregarding their risk profile, it produced a modelling bias. It could be argued that
the capital reduction was driven by better risks management within the banks, which is not
entirely false, nevertheless the inital lack of experience led to too low forfaitary capital charges
which were used as a benchmark for the AMA. Besides, and we would like to emphasize this
point, loss data sets (internal or external) are not used in the basic and the standard approach
to compute capital requirements. The regulatory capital in those cases is evaluated as a fraction
of the net banking income. Therefore, we cannot compare these approaches with the AMA. We
show with empirical studies the difficulty to assess a correct level of charges. Therefore, after
suggesting higher risk levels for the basic and the standard approach, we provide conservative
and accurate solutions to model operational risks. The choice of methodologies is crucial and
we detail those evidences at different steps of the calibration process.
1.2 The basic tools: LDA and VaR
A traditional way to deal with operational risks is the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) [12].
This aims at building a Loss Distribution Function (LDF) ([13] for instance) G which is the
mixture of a frequency distribution p(k) and a severity distribution F (x) (whose density is given
by f), thus
G =
∞∑
γ=1
p(k)F ∗γ(x), x > 0, Gb,e = 0, x = 0, (1.1)
where ∗ denotes the convolution operator and F ∗γ the γ-fold convolution of F with itself. We
denote g the density of G, and
g =
∞∑
k=γ
p(k)f∗γ(x), x > 0. (1.2)
Experts working on operational risks agree on the fact that the frequency distribution has a
negligible impact on the LDF’s quantile which provides in fine the regulatory capital. However,
the choice of the severity distribution has a tremendous impact on this because it is the most
pertinent information in terms of level of loss. The capital charge pertaining to G is obtained,
at the request of the regulators, through a 99.9% Value-at-Risk (VaR) - a quantile computed
from this LDF. We recall now the definition of the VaR measure,
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Definition 1.1. Given a confidence level α ∈ [0, 1], the VaR associated to a random variable X
is given by the smallest number x such that the probability that X exceeds x is not larger than
(1− α)
V aR(1−α)% = inf(x ∈ R : P (X > x) ≤ (1− α)). (1.3)
Here, the random variable X is associated to a cell of the Basel matrix (Table 1). To compute
P (X > x) we need to determine the LDF associated with this random variable, thus the choice
of the severity distribution which constitutes this LDF will have a tremendous impact on the
final capital allocation.
Severity distribution K-S test VaR (95%) ES (95%) VaR (99.9%) ES (99.9%)
Lognormal <2.2 e-16 6 448 883 7 531 208 13 354 724 17 863 146
Weibull <2.2 e-16 4 081 999 4 204 917 4 530 362 4 631 586
GPD <2.2 e-16 33 512 000 192 902 521 1 009 472 708 4 865 819 191
Gumbel <2.2 e-16 4 247 871 4 336 857 4 597 061 4 669 047
GB2 <2.2 e-16 9 321 772 19 497 566 76 326 374 253 422 675
g-and-h <2.2 e-16 6 030 146 6 289 353 6 940 614 7 231 981
Table 2: Several theoretical distributions have been fitted from a data set representing the
External Fraud events of the Retail Banking business line of the Banques Populaire perimeter.
The table presents very poor goodness-of-fit tests results. In this case it is not possible to state
which distribution is better than the others. The fifth column presents the capital charges we
would have using these distributions, and the sixth the Expected Shortfall. These results are
compared to 95% confidence level risk measures.
For instance to model the severities of a sample representing the External Fraud event on the
Retail Banking business line, we have fitted by maximum likelihood estimation and tested the
following distributions (for which we provide the densities in appendix B): the lognormal distri-
bution, the Weibull distribution, the Gumbel distribution, the Generalized Pareto distribution
(GPD) [23, 11], the GB2 distribution ([17], [24]), and the g-and-h distribution ([20], [9]). For the
choosen sample, we provide, for each distribution the corresponding capital requirement com-
puted using the 95% and 99.9% Value-at-Risk (VaR) introduced in (1.3). The second column
of Table 2 provides the result of an adequacy test based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance
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to check the quality of the fit of these statistical distributions to the data sets. They all failed,
thus statistically we cannot accept any of these distributions. Nevertheless if we continue the
exercise2 columms 3 and 5 contain the capital computed using the VaR for two values of α.
Colums 4 and 6 exhibit the capital requirements that the banks need if we use another measure
named Expected Shortfall given by (3.1). Looking at these four columns we observe that the
choice of the distribution has a tremendous impact on the capital allocation. Thus at this point,
there is a trade-off between the choice of a distribution that minimises the capital allocation
(here the Gumbel one), or a distribution which provides a more conservative capital (here the
GB2). We also observe large differences with respect to the choice of the so-called risk measure.
Thus, besides the calibration problem, the choice of risk measure is crucial. We will now expand
these points more in details.
In the first part of section 2, we will discuss estimation of the LDF for each cell of the matrix,
and provide the corresponding regulatory capital with respect to the corresponding LDF and the
chosen risk measure. In section 3 we introduce a dependence structure between the cells, and
for the different risk measures we will produce several capital charges. Finally the last section
concludes with some important remarks focusing on the impact of the distribution families, the
parameter estimation procedures and the risk measures on the regulatory capital. To complete
our analysis, Appendixes provide statistics of the data sets used (Appendix A), exact densities of
the distribution considered in this paper (Appendix B) and a comparison of estimation methods
for the GPD parameters (Appendix C).
2 Estimation of the severities in each cell: the importance of
the tail distribution
Before providing a capital associated with the global matrix, we need to analyse the behavior
of each cell. We need to know the correct distribution that characterizes each cell. It is now
recognised that for a proper statistical adjustment of the severity distribution, we must take into
account the existence of extreme values in the analysis of the loss data sets (Table 2). There are
2To continue this exercise is not unrealistic as soon as severity distributions like the lognormal distribution is
commonly used in banks to compute the LDF
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several approaches to consider which are all part of the extreme value theory [21]. Following this
theory in a recent paper, we have proposed a flexible approach [15] to model the severity distri-
butions. Our approach is a mixture of two distributions: one characterizing the most important
losses (the tail) using the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD), and the latter modelling the
remaining data (the central part of the distribution or corpus). We used a GPD on the right tail
for which we provided innovative theoretical and practical solutions, and fit a lognormal3 distri-
bution on the remaining data via an EM algorithm. Figure 1 illustrates the approach. Then, to
build the final LDF, we applied an adapted Monte Carlo algorithm. Once the threshold of the
GPD has been found, the method chosen to estimate GPD’s parameters tremendously impacts
the VaR: it seems that the influence of the estimation procedure on the computation of the
capital allocation has never been discussed before and we provide some details in Appendix C.
The estimation procedure for the GPD we selected in this paper is based on the maximization
of the Anderson-Darling statistic [22].
Thus, we define the severity distribution as a mixture of a lognormal distribution on the corpus,
and a GPD on the right tail (cauda,) whose density f(x;u, β, ξ) is :
f(x;u, β, ξ, µ, σ) =

f (corpus)(x;µ, σ), if x < u
f (cauda) = 11−∫ u0 f (center)(x;µ,σ)dx × fGPD(x;u, β, ξ)), if x ≥ u
, (2.1)
where, µ and σ are the lognormal distribution parameters, and fGPD the density of the GPD
given in Appendix B.
In Table 3, we provide the capital requirements computed using different distributions for the
cell associated with the business line "Payment & Settlement" and the event type "Delivery,
Execution and Process Management" for the year 2006. We observed that by using the lognor-
mal distribution only provides a very less conservative regulatory capital than using the POT
method we introduced above. Note that when we adjusted only a GPD on the data set, we did
not obtain workable results because either the parameters could not be properly estimated, or
we faced an infinite mean model (ξ > 1).
3The lognormal assumption was the best on our data sets, but one can fit any other distributions.
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Severity distribution VaR (95%) ES (95%) VaR (99.9%) ES (99.9%)
Lognormal 305 303 336 455 463 192 533 160
GPD ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
POT 1 388 655 3 070 808 15 627 945 30 166 707
Table 3: We provide risk measures on the data set which represents the severity of the business
line "Payment & Settlement" and the event type "Delivery, Execution and Process Management"
for the year 2006, comparing different hypothesis for the severity distribution. We cannot provide
a GPD estimation on the whole data set as the shape parameter is superior to 1, and therefore
we face an infinite mean model.
We also observed large amount differences with respect to the choice of the risk measure: the
VaR or the ES. This is discussed in more detail below.
3 Capital charge associated with a coherent risk measure
The regulator imposed a confidence level of 99.9% for the capital charge, therefore if we use
the VaR measure, we have α = 0.1% in (1.3). Nevertheless, using this risk measure, we face
several problems, especially while computing a global capital charge. Indeed, the sum of the
VaRs may be lower than the VaR of the sum i.e. the VaR is known not to be subadditive, and
the result is questionnable as soon as several loss distributions are aggregated. On the other
hand, this measure -by definition- does not take into account the large losses. However, the
Conditional VAR (CVaR) or Expected Shortfall (ES) is a coherent measure [2] and therefore it
is more appropriate to work with it. We recall its definition:
Definition 3.1. For a given α in [0, 1], η the V aR(1−α)%, and X a random variable which
represents losses during a prespecified period (such as a day, a week, or some other chosen time
period) then,
ES(1−α)% = E(X|X > η) (3.1)
The ES measure which is subadditive takes into account the information contained in the distri-
bution tail contrary to the VaR measure. Therefore, some extremal event exposures are captured
by the ES measure. However in practice the ES value may be much higher than the correspond-
ing VaR value, therefore, a lower confidence level could be used when considering the ES measure
11
compared to the VaR measure.
As illustrated in Table 2, it might be judicious to use a GB2 distribution to model the severity
and to compute a 95% ES than to use a lognormal distribution at a 99.9% VaR. Thus, we see
that, to take into account very large losses, it could be more appropriate to associate at the same
time the use of extreme distributions and the ES measure. In this case the result is closer to
reality, and more effective to help banks understanding extremal events and by the way prevent-
ing them. In Tables 2 and 3, we illustrate these facts. We observed a large difference between
the capital computed with the VaR and the ES measures. Thus, a trade-off between a VaR at
99.9% and an ES at 95% should be considered .
In these two tables we have seen the impact of the choice of risk measure on the capital compu-
tation. Now this impact can also be illustrated if we study the composition of the matrix and its
granularity. Indeed, until now we used collected data organised into the Basel Matrix [4]. The
first level of granularity is made up of 56 cases - 8 business lines ("b") × 7 event types ("e")4.
Nevertheless, each event type might be further broken down into several elements. For example,
the "external fraud" event may be shared in two items - "Theft and Fraud" and "Systems Secu-
rity" (second level of granularity). In a third level, the element "Theft and Fraud" may be split in
several components: "Theft/Robbery", "Forgery" and "Check kiting". After a deep analysis, we
observe that the kind of losses expected from a fraud with a credit card does not correspond to
losses caused by someone hacking the system for instance. Nevertheless these two different kinds
of losses are in the same cell. Therefore, considering the largest level of granularity, we could
face multimodal empirical distributions. Consequently, the methods used to model the losses
depend on the choice of granularity of the Basel matrix. This choice might have a tremendous
impact on capital requirement computations. Besides, there is a trade-off between the quantity
of data and the robustness of the estimations. Indeed, if the quantity of data is not sufficient,
we cannot go to a more granular level; on the other hand the empirical distribution is therefore
an aggregate of various types of data and the estimation of this last empirical distribution can
4The business lines are corporate finance, trading & sales, retail banking, commercial banking, payment and
settlement, agency services, asset management and retail brokerage. The event types are internal fraud, external
fraud, employment practices & workplace safety, clients, products & business practices, damage to physical assets,
business disruption & system failures and execution, delivery & process management.
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be source of unusable results.
For the moment, we cannot empirically illustrate these remarks because we do not have the
appropriate information set. Nevertheless it seems reasonable, in order to be close to reality, to
introduce the computation of the distributions associated to the second or even third level of
data granularity in order not to bias the LDF, as long as this information exists.
4 Influence of the dependence structure between the cells on
the regulatory capital computation
Banks need to have in fine an amount calculated using the global matrix. This means that,
as soon as the LDFs have been determined for each cell, the next question is the best way to
combine these distributions to provide a global regulatory capital i.e. corresponding to the whole
matrix.
Traditionally the experts computed the global capital requirement summing the capital calcu-
lated in each cell. This procedure does not take into account the true dependence which exists
within the cells. One way to bypass this problem is to use a copula distribution which is a
multivariate distribution permitting to link a huge number of distributions. During recent years
some experts used the Gaussian copula to take these dependences into account, claiming inabil-
ity to perform calculations using other copulas in high dimensions. The well-known Gaussian
structure is not adapted to loss data sets (indeed, the Gaussian structure is elliptical, and does
not capture tail dependence), and since 2005 it is now possible to work with copulas in high di-
mensions using nested copulas or vines [1]. Recently, we used this last methodology and adapted
it to compute the capital requirement associated with operational risks in high dimensions [14].
Extending this work the main improvements for practitioners are the following:
• Firstly, this methodology enables the use of numerous classes of copulas without restricting
to the elliptic domain. One can consider copulas which focus on information contained in
the tails, where we find the large losses.
• Secondly, this approach allows several combinations of margins (corresponding to the dis-
13
tributions computed for each cell) to derive robust adjustments in the statistical sense.
• Thirdly, even working in the highest dimension, the procedure is easy to implement and is
not too time consuming.
• Finally, this method complies with the lastest Basel Committee [7] requirements.
Below, the results obtained considering several cells of the Basel matrix5 are provided. In Table
4 we introduce some notations corresponding to the losses we have studied.
BUSINESS BUSINESS LINES Loss Distributions
UNITS LEVEL 1
INVESTMENT BANKING (2) Trading & Sales B1
BANKING
(3) Retail Banking B2
(5) Payment & Settlement B3
OTHERS (8) Retail Brokerage B4
Table 4: Restricted Basel Matrix used to compute operational risk global capital allocation. B1,
B2, B3, B4 are the four loss distributions used in the vine methodology. B2 and B3 are built
considering respectively (F2, F5, F8, F9) and (F3, F6, F7, F10) as single data sets. In this case,
our aggregation is "Business Line" oriented (Table 1).
In a first exercise, we show how to compute the amount corresponding to these four cells. The
diagram is provided in Figure 2. We begin by estimating the margins associated with the cells
B1, B2, B3 and B4. Thus, in a first step, we link the couples (B1, B2), (B1, B4) and (B3, B4)
with a copula whose parameter is estimated by maximum likelihood (and sense checked using
the Kendall τ). In a second step we link the copulas previously obtained by other copulas and
so on. The choice of the cells to find the copula results from a sharp analysis of the data sets
(cells). Nevertheless, some statistical studies enabling the decision of which links are appropriate
can be found in ([16] and [14]).
5Nevertheless the complete Basel matrix could contain more than 250 cells, and thus more research will be
necessary to work with such a large matrix, mainly to limit the time of computation. Recent improvements using
parallel computing, seem to provide interesting solutions to achieve this purpose [8].
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C1234(C124, C134)
C124(C12, C14) C134(C14, C34)
C12(B1, B2) C14(B1, B4) C34(B3, B4)
B2 B1 B4 B3
Figure 2: 4-dimensional vine estimation to obtain the dependence structure for the whole Basel
Matrix.
In Table 5 we provide the amount computed using VaR and ES measures. The results given in
the first line correspond to the global amounts obtained summing the VaR provided by the four
margins B1, ..., B4, considering different distributions to model the severities: 1 corresponds to
a non parametric estimation procedure, 2 corresponds to the lognormal distribution estimated
and 3 corresponds to the Gumbel adjustment. In the second line we provide the results obtained
linking the marginal distributions with the Gumbel copula with a parameter θ = 5.34 obtained
applying the previous vine methodology presented above; 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the same
distributions for the margins as before. Looking at the third column we observe that we do not
have the same amount if we sum the four cells (methodology based on a univariate approach) or
if we use a copula methodology. The capital charges are very similar, but bigger in the first case.
As a result, not taking into account the dependencies at all may lead to over conservative capi-
tal charges, even more conservative than using an extreme value copula (for instance a Gumbel
one). The similar results between the two aggregation methodologies is a coincidence due to the
fact that a simple sum of high quantiles (VaR) intuitively implies a strong dependence of large
losses and the Gumbel copula we obtained mimics this behaviour. If we compare the third and
the fourth column we observe that the capital charges are always bigger using the ES measure:
this confirms comments made previously. When a Gumbel distribution is used on the margins,
the two methods are competitive, indeed, the results are nearly similar. The use of lognormal
distribution provides more conservative results. The use of nonparametric modelling provides a
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value between the two previous situations. It seems to us that obtaining a very good fit on the
margins is conducive with providing a realistic amount of capital. The modelling of the margins
can be more influential than the fit of the copula, nevertheless, using upper tail dependence
copula structures allows a more conservative capital charge for banks.
C1234(B1,B2,B3,B4) Margins VaR ES
Univariate
1 68 468 561 71 030 541
2 76 817 362 94 196 483
3 48 113 918 48 244 680
Gumbel Copula
1 68 517 234 71 028 526
2 76 564 982 93 187 912
3 48 112 494 48 241 814
Table 5: This table provides the capital allocation (VaR) and the ES for the whole data set,
considering three classes of severities (1 denotes the non parametric approach of the LDF, 2
the lognormal approach and 3 the Gumbel one.) and two classes of dependence. Univariate
corresponds to the VaRs sum of each LDF. The alternative corresponds to an aggregation using
a Gumbel copula.
We now propose another exercise. In Table 1 we consider the cell F9 corresponding to Business
Disruption & System Failure events in the Retail Banking business unit and the distribution
associated to the cell F6 characterizing the same events in the Payment & Settlement business
unit. For the distribution F9 we estimate a Gumbel distribution or a lognormal distribution,
for the distribution F6 we estimate a Generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) or a lognormal
distribution. Tables 6 and 7 provide the capital values when we link these two distributions with
a Gumbel copula on one hand and with a Clayton copula on another hand. In columns 4 and 5
we provide the capital computed using the VaR and the ES measures respectively. Columns 2
and 3 gives the amount corresponding to each cell obtained by projection from the fourth column.
The results of these tables show that depending on the way we model the margins, we have
tremendous differences between the VaRs. For example, we would have a VaR equal to 117 207
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402 euros if F9 is modeled with a lognormal distribution and F6 with a GPD distribution versus
a VaR equal to 2 037 655 euros if F9 is modeled with a lognormal distribution and F6 with a
Gumbel one. Depending on the way we model the LDFs, the aggregated VaR may be multiplied
by 57.52. The same behavior is observable when we project the corresponding values on the
cells. For example, the multivariate VaR projection on F9 is e 2 655 055 if F6 is modeled using a
lognormal distribution, and is equal to e 15 405 192 if F6 is modeled using a GPD distribution.
The peak for the VaR observed in that latter case is due to the capture of extreme events through
the choice of the margins: the Gumbel one. Finally, using at the same time copula and severity
distributions, which take into account information in the tail, provides very accurate results.
Indeed, when we model F6 using a GPD associated with a Gumbel copula, we provide a larger
VaR than with the Clayton one. The differences are observed comparing the amounts e 105
422 356 with e 103 249 260 on the one hand, and e 117 207 402 with e 107 807 238 on the other.
In Table 6 we see that the capital requirements obtained using a Gumbel copula are bigger
than those obtained with a Clayton one, thus the choice of the dependence structure also has
an impact on the computation of the capital charges. Now, if we use the VaR measure the
difference is not significant for a bank (columns 4 in Tables 6 and 7), but if we compare the
results obtained with the ES measure (columns 5 in Tables 6 and 7) the difference is tremendous
(up to almost a billion euros). Nevertheless, choosing the ES measure at a 99.9% confidence level
induces a much larger capital amount considering an upper tail depencence structure (Gumbel
copula) than an lower tail dependence (Clayton copula).
Model Gumbel Copula
LDF9 LDF6 VaR ES
Gumbel-GPD 2 322 782 103 099 574 105 422 356 1 603 169 459
Gumbel-lognormal 1 471 343 566 312 2 037 655 3 091 139
lognormal-GPD 15 405 192 101 802 210 117 207 402 1 904 323 684
Table 6: For the LDF corresponding to F9 and F6 we provide the VaRs and the ES computed
from a Gumbel copula for the year 2006. They are given respectively for three classes of severities.
For instance, "Gumbel-GPD" means that we have chosen a Gumbel distribution to model F9
and a mix of a lognormal and a GPD to model F6.
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Model Clayton Copula
LDF9 LDF6 VaR ES
Gumbel-GPD 1 154 681 102 094 579 103 249 260 739 977 372
Gumbel-lognormal 1 455 693 649 164 2 104 857 2 637 980
lognormal-GPD 5 631 004 102 176 234 107 807 238 1 092 923 925
Table 7: For the LDF corresponding to F9 and F6 we provide the VaRs and the ES computed
from a Clayton copula for the year 2006. They are given respectively for three classes of severities.
For instance, "Gumbel-GPD" means that we have chosen a Gumbel distribution to model F9
and a mix of a lognormal and a GPD to model F6.
Finally, another exercise allows us to see the influence of the dependence structure on the cells
for which we need to know the capital allocation. Applying a vine approach, we obtained a
Gumbel copula to model the dependence between several LDFs. Computing the corresponding
multivariate VaR, we derived a global capital charge. In Table 11, we projected from the multi-
variate VaR given in column 7, the amount corresponding to each cell (axis). For example, for
the second line corresponding to the "Retail Banking", we can provide the amounts pertaining
independently to the "External Fraud", the "Clients, Products & Business Practices", the "Dam-
age to Physical Assets" and the "Business Disruption & System Failures" event types (Table 1
line 3, column 2, 5, 8, 9). Our approach is interesting because it provides the capital for each cell
through the dependence structure between the cells. This approach is totally different from the
approach mainly used by practitioners who directly compute the capital associated with each
cell without taking into account the information given by any other cell.
Table 11 highlights the fact that an upper tail dependence structure (line 3) always provides
larger capital charges than the sum of the univariate VaRs. We can also say that the larger the
tail of the theoretical distribution, the larger the gap between the ES and the VaR.
5 Conclusion: New Proposals
In this paper, we discussed a range of options for assessing Basel Pillar 1’s capital charges for
operational risk. We have expanded them and increased both reliability and precision in our
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Approach LDF LDF2 LDF5 LDF8 LDF9 VaR ES
Univariate
1 19 650 986 3 182 731 14 212 411 2 241 011 39 287 139 40 899 526
2 6 240 984 2 151 627 11 676 534 4 049 831 24 118 976 32 957 873
3 13 599 313 2 478 087 8 599 313 1 087 410 25 764 123 25 887 436
Gumbel Copula
1 20 578 056 3 300 471 15 191 828 2 386 106 41 456 461 43 024 128
2 10 732 933 2 310 337 29 525 155 13 608 000 56 176 425 79 500 929
3 13 617 419 2 486 453 8 603 916 1 095 587 25 803 375 25 927 487
Table 8: This table provides the VaRs and ES associated with each LDF of the set LDF2, LDF5,
LDF8 and LDF9 when we decompose the dependence structure of the 4-dimensional set C2589,
considering three classes of severities (1 denotes the non parametric approach of the LDF, 2 the
lognormal approach and 3 the Gumbel one.).
measurement, management and control of operational risks. As we had the opportunity to ex-
periment the methods suggested in literature using real data sets, we found various drawbacks
and pitfalls, and we proposed solutions to bypass them.
We suggested the use of a Peak-over-Threshold method to thicken the right tail of the loss dis-
tribution function. Presenting this solution, we suggested an efficient way to obtain generalized
Pareto distribution parameters which is accurate regarding goodness-of-fit tests, and therefore
compliant regarding the regulator. Furthermore, our methods have shown conservative results
and quantitatively supported the idea that some data sets might be badly built.
We provided an innovative solution to compute aggregated risk measures (VaR and ES), dealing
with dependences between Basel categories. This solution is based on nested structures and vine
architectures. Carrying out this methodology, we were able to take into account specific depen-
dences (upper tail etc.) between many margins with Archimedean and extreme value copulas.
We also studied the sensitivity of multivariate VaRs to modeled LDFs (margins), to dependence
architectures and to copulas parameters.
In addition of these results, we observed that estimating dynamically the parameter of the de-
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pendence structure creates important variations in the values of the Gumbel copula parameter.
We illustrated this fact in Table 9. We computed the parameter of the Gumbel copula linking the
LDFs of the cells F9 and F6. This parameter θ varied with respect to the information set used for
its estimation. The parameters’ value obtained using the year 2006, was different when we used
the year 2007 or the year 2008, or the whole sample. We noticed that the upper tail dependence
was larger when we used this last data set. This will have an impact on the computation of capi-
tal requirements. Thus, with the information set we use, the capital requirement appeared to be
more or less conservative, and notion of dynamics inside the data needs to be taken into account.
Year θ θ
2006 4.9202 (0.94)
10.6610 (0.88)2007 3.7206 (0.75)
2008 5.8490 (0.51)
Table 9: Parameter estimation of Gumbel copulas estimated on F9 and F6 for each year 2006,
2007 and 2008 (second column). These parameters are compared to a Gumbel copula parameter
estimated on the entire time series (third column). The corresponding standard deviation are
provided in brackets.
Therefore, we suggest to work dynamically and therefore measure the impact of the time passing
on the distribution shapes. This idea led us to challenge the 5 years data sets required by the
authorities. Indeed, these data sets may include outdated data - for example, a incident occurred
in a department that does not exist anymore - or not old enough and some long memory process
should be involved.
Last but not least, we suggested to compute capital charges considering another risk measure
than the VaR measure, say the expected shortfall. This measure is coherent and also take into
account the whole information contained in the tail. Computing a Capital allocation from a
99.9% ES is not realistic as it appears to be too conservative, but a lower critical threshold could
be considered. For example one could consider a 95% ES instead of a 99.9% VaR (Table 2) as
we illustrate in the previous exercises.
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A Appendix: Distributions statistics
Next table provides the four first moments of the empirical severities corresponding to the cells
of the Basel matrix (Table 1)used in this paper.
Distributions Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis
F1 195.37 292732.86 7.31 71.69
F2 1522.83 372183311.54 27.57 910.13
F3 175.42 3804557.63 30.03 956.75
F4 1805.81 93274002.03 18.74 457.58
F5 1824.95 189175093.33 17.79 354.00
F6 1200.08 438224165.80 23.69 563.48
F7 800.14 24268504.39 10.88 139.39
F8 1779 1602373386 19.27 435.88
F9 1824.95 189175093.3 17.79 354.00
F10 12104 519962084.2 108.03 11806.23
Table 10: Statistics of the data sets used. The distributions are right skewed and present large
kurtosis.
B Appendix: Distributions for the severities
We provide the densities of the main severity distributions we used along this paper.
• lognormal distribution:
fb,e(x;µ, σ) =
1
xσ
√
2pi
e−
(log(x)−µ)2
2σ2 , (B.1)
for x > 0, µ ∈ R, σ ∈ R+∗.
• Weibull distribution:
fb,e(x;β, ξ) =
ξ
β
x
β
ξ−1
e
−( x
β
)ξ
, (B.2)
for x > 0, β > 0, ξ > 0.
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• Gumbel distribution:
fb,e(x;u, β) =
1
β
e
x−u
β
−e
x−u
β
, (B.3)
with u ∈ R and β > 0.
• Generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) ([23, 11]):
fb,e(x;u, β, ξ) =
1
β
(
1 + u(x− ξ)
β
)(−1− 1
u
)
, (B.4)
with 1 + u (x−ξ)β > 0, β > 0 and ξ 6= 0 (or fb,e(x;u, β, ξ) = 1β
(
− (x−ξ)β
)
if u = 0).
• GB2 distribution ([17], [24]):
fb,e(x;α, β, p, q) =
αxαp−1
βαpB(p, q)
[
1 +
(
x
β
)p+q] (B.5)
where α, β, p, q, x >,B(u, v) = Γ(u)Γ(v)Γ(u+ v) is the Beta function, and Γ(.) is the
Gamma function.
• g-and-h distribution ([20], [9]):
fb,e(x; g, h) = exp((g∗x)−1) ∗ exp
(
(h∗p2)
2
)
g (B.6)
when g = 0 and h = 0, the g-and-h distribution reduces to a standard normal distribution.
C Appendix: Influence of estimation methods on the amount
of regulatory capital
We show the influence of the estimation procedures of GPD’s parameters used in section 2 on
capital requirements. Assuming a bootstrap method to estimate the threshold ([18], [10]), we
estimate the remaining ξ and β parameters of the GPDs defined in (2.1) using the method in-
troduced by [22], denoting this method M1. We also consider three other alternative estimation
methods to estimate these parameters in order to check their impact on VaR computations.
These ones are respectively the Pickands method (M2) [23], the Hill method (M3) [19], and the
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Maximum Likelihood method (M4). We provide in Table 11 the estimations of GDPs parame-
ters (with their standard deviation in brackets) obtained for both sets, using these four methods
and the corresponding capital charges.
Note that a shape parameter ξ > 1 in (2.1) induce an infinite mean model which naturally pro-
vides very high VaRs. Nevertheless, non-parametric estimator such as Pickands might provide
this kind of value and by the way unusable models.
Method β ξ VaR ES
M1 932.854 0.767 15 700 112 34 215 896
(83.71) (0.101)
M2 682.615 1.144 538 480 990 ∞
(160.70) (0.266)
M3 1007 0.66 5 725 341 14 780 214
(214.36) (0.228)
M4 904.087 0.827 27 944 558 125 019 034
(92.31) (0.097)
Table 11: We provide risk measures on the data set which represents the severity of the business
line "Payment & Settlement" and the event type "Delivery, Execution and Process Management"
for the year 2006, given estimations of the GPD’s parameters ξ and β (Appendix B) using four
methods for uˆ = 179. M1 is the method introduced by Luceno [22], M2 is the Pickands method,
M3 is the Hill method, and M4 is the Maximum Likelihood method. We provide in brackets
the standard deviations computed by bootstrapping. The third column gives the 99.9% VaR
(regulatory capital allocation) pertaining to these estimates (µ = 3.593098, σ = 1.510882). The
fourth column presents the corresponding expected shortfall capital value.
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